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Reply to Melissa Moschella
E. Christian Brugger
MOSCHELLA BEGINS by discussing confusions in the braindeath debate surrounding the use of the concepts of “integration” and
“wholeness.” Some scholars, she says, such as Alan Shewmon, take the
presence of biological integration as an indication of ontological wholeness.
Others, such as the members of the President’s Council for Bioethics, think that
some bodily integration can persist in the body of a brain-dead individual; but
that the subject in which it persists in not a whole.
Moschella concedes that brain-dead bodies can express biological
integration. She argues, however, that the presence of integration per se does
not settle whether the body is a corpse or of a living human individual. Only
what she calls “higher level” or “substantial biological integration” (as opposed
to “lower level” or “non- substantial” integration”) makes the parts of a body
into an ontological whole. Only an ontologically whole human body is the
body of a living human being. So, the point of her paper, as I understand it, is
to help us answer the question of whether brain-dead bodies – with whatever
integration they express – are ontological wholes. Moschella argues that they
are not and that therefore we can confidently deny that the integration
expressed in them is “higher level, substantial biological integration.”
Her argument runs like this. “Organismal unity,” she says, consists in the
interrelationship among the natural functions of an organism’s parts.1 This
interrelatedness is the organism’s “principle” of organization. This principle
is essentially the “functional unity” of the parts of an organism. Now, not all
parts are equally important. Some parts, she says, are “vital parts.” A “vital
part” performs functions necessary to sustain the life of the organism (e.g.,
organs and organ systems). Nor are all vital parts equally important. Some vital
parts are “regulative” – meaning that they control the functions of other vital
parts.

P
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1

Moschella draws on the ideas of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz to formulate this
part of her argument. Joshua Hoffman & Gary S. Rosenkrantz, Substance: Its
Nature and Existence (New York NY: Routledge, 1997).
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At the top of the hierarchy of regulative vital parts is what she calls the
“master vital part.” She defines the master vital part as that which “controls”
all other parts of the body. Following Hoffman and Rozenkrantz, she says:
It appears to be the case that all known organisms have such a master part, although the
master part need not be centralized. In plants, for instance, it is plausible that the master
part is the system comprised by the roots, stem, and leaves (but excluding the sap). In
adult vertebrates, the master part seems to be centralized, consisting of the central
nervous system (brain and spinal cord).2

She claims that in humans the “brain and spinal cord” constitute the master
vital part.
At first it looks as if she is going to resurrect the account of the 1981
President’s Commission (formulated by James Bernat and others) of the brain
as master regulator of the holistic unity of the body. In a sense she does that,
but with this twist. Whereas the Bernat-President’s Commission account
argued that total brain-death results in the collapse of all of the body’s
integrative unity – something that Dr. Shewmon’s research later refuted –
Moschella says that the brain-dead body can express some integrative somatic
unity, but not to an “optimal degree.” In other words, the “control” exercised
by the master part – absent in brain-dead bodies – is not over the existence of
integrative functioning, but over optimal functioning.
In reply, Moschella offers no strong reasons to believe that her account of
the “master part” is true. She says:
The claim that a master part, so defined, is required for organismal unity is not an a
priori truth (though it may still be a necessary one), but is based on the observation that
in all known cases, the regulation or control of the life-processes of the parts of an
organism is accomplished by means of the activities of a system of biological parts that
jointly have a natural function, and this system is referred to as the master part.

This is problematic for two reasons. The first is empirical. She uses the phrase
“in all known cases.” Does this mean that a master part, as she defines it, is
demonstrably present in all the millions of known organisms? Has this really
been verified? She references Hoffman & Rosenkrantz, but they are philosophers, not biologists. When they refer to examples of master parts (see the

2

Moschella, p. 3.

E. Christian Brugger

19

passage reproduced in Moschella’s note 21) they refer to the examples as
“apparent.” Similarly, Moschella herself says that the universality of a master
part “appears to be the case” and that in adult vertebrates the part “seems to be
centralized” – hardly conclusive language. Moschella’s account of the “master
vital part” is a hypothesis. Given the evidence, it may be plausible, but mere
plausibility is not an adequate ground for moral certitude in this question upon
which the lives of countless innocent human beings depend. After all,
Aristotelian embryology and Ptolemaic astronomy were plausible, but flatly
wrong.
The second reason is philosophical. Pace Moschella, the proposition that
a master part as she defines it is necessary for ontological wholeness acts in her
account as an a priori. It excludes at the outset at least three other possibilities:
(1) that the living body’s integration may not be governed by any master part;
(2) that the master part may not be centralized or that it may have both a
centralized and a diffuse dimension; and (3) that the vital functions of a
centralized master part may be compensated for by other organs in physiologically stable brain-dead individuals.
Although a brain-dead body’s organs and organ systems do not function
to an optimal degree, they can function, function together, and function in
extraordinarily complex ways. The brain-dead body can grow proportionately,
maintain homeostasis, recover from cardiac arrest, heal wounds, gestate babies,
contract fevers, and manifest hypertension, flushing, and immune responses.
These functions appear to be carried out by a whole. Each of the several trillion
cells, the dozens of organs, and several organ systems from the tip of the toe
to the top of the thoracic cavity seem to be functioning for the good of the
whole.
Moschella gives no reason for concluding that when the brain is dead the
individual is dead except that when the brain-master-part is dead, the body
cannot operate to an optimal degree. And my reply is that her account is
plausible, but it is not obvious that it is the right account in all cases, and so it
leaves room for reasonable doubt.
The whole idea of a master part rests on what “seems” to be the case. She
has not established that what seems to be the case is the case. Why must a
whole be governed by a master part? Because, she argues, in all known
instances a body without a functioning master part seems not to be a whole,
and the brain-dead body has no functional master part. I reply that it seems to
be the case that the physiologically stable brain-dead body is in fact carrying
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out its own somatic functioning.
Even conceding that there is a master part, why must it be centralized?
Moschella replies in this way: because it seems to be the case that in higher
vertebrates the master part is always centralized. I reply that from the evidence
gathered from brain-dead bodies it seems as likely that holistic integration is
carried out by the whole body (especially the spinal cord and nervous system),
and not by any centralized organ.
If we concede even further that the brain is a centralized regulator of
holistic integration, why can’t the minimally-necessary vital integrating
functions be compensated for by the remaining spinal cord and nervous system
when the brain is destroyed? A metaphor might explain this better. The body
has a capacity that acts as a kind of back-up-generator. When the main power
goes out (i.e., when brain-mediated integration ceases), the back-up capacity
kicks in such that the rest of the body provides the minimally necessary
integrative functioning needed to live. Moschella’s a priori account excludes
this possibility. But she gives no reason whatsoever why it should be excluded.
Merely asserting that the brain is the master part and that the master part is
necessary for life, and then dealing with the complex expressions of somatic
functioning of some brain-dead bodies by saying “they’re not optimized,
therefore not truly human functioning” will not do.
It seems to be the case that vital functioning carries on in brain-dead
individuals and that what is lost is merely optimization. To Moschella,
optimization is a pre-condition for wholeness. But all disability involves by
definition non-optimal functioning. So, to define this disability (i.e., the nonoptimal functioning as arising from brain death) as expressive of human death
is arbitrary.
Consequently, her account leaves room for reasonable doubt that what
appears to be the operations of a disabled human being are just that.
In fact, Shewmon agrees with Moschella that the brain plays a necessary
role in the modulation and enhancing of the functions of the body. He thinks,
however, that the brain is not necessary for a body to be whole. His claim is
manifestly not a priori. It is based upon the observation of rightly diagnosed
brain-dead individuals, which led him to claim that true human somatic
integration is not brain dependent.
In conclusion, Moschella arbitrarily defines the master part as one that is
both necessary for life and centralized. In so doing she excludes the possibilities (1) that the vital integration of the human body may not be exclusively
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controlled by a master part, (2) that the master part may not be centralized but
may be diffused throughout the whole body, and (3) that the vital integrating
functions of the master part may be compensated for by the remaining spinal
cord and nervous system in the case that the brain is destroyed.
Because of the plausibility of these alternatives, her account effectively
asserts only one empirically demonstrable conclusion, namely, that when the
brain is destroyed the body’s integrating capacity is not optimal. But nobody
contests this.
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